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Internationally
Introduction
Modem wire transfer systems allow banks and large corporations to
make payments and effect settlements with remarkable speed.1 These
systems move staggering volumes of money, with the major wire net-
works transferring almost $1 trillion dollars a day. The average wire
transfer transaction involves $2 million, and most wire transfers send
payments across international boundaries. 2 Evidence suggests that the
use of wire transfers will continue to grow.3
A simple wire transfer executes a payor-payee transaction using
sophisticated computer technology. For example, suppose a Chicago
1. Wire transfers take only a "few minutes" to transfer funds while checks can
take two to six days. J. VERGARI & V. SHUE, CHECKS, PAYMENTS AND ELECTRONIC
BANKING 524 (1986) [hereinafter VERGARI & SHUE].
The term wire transfer as used in this Note differs from the term "electronic funds
transfer." An electronic funds transfer refers to all forms of electronic payment
including automatic teller machines, point-of-sale transactions, and automated clear-
ing houses. A wire transfer, by contrast, transfers large values through pay orders
and is used exclusively by banks, large economic entities and corporations. A pay
order instructs a bank to transfer money from one account to another. Banks have
used wire transfers since shortly after the invention of the telegraph, but the advent
of computer and telecommunications technology has contributed to the recent rise in
their use. Tallackson & Vallejo, International Commercial Wire Transfers: The Lack of
Standards, 11 N.C. J. INT'L L. & COM. REG. 639 (1986) [hereinafter Tallackson].
2. U.C.C. Revision Committee Introduces New Article 4A Governing Wire Transfers 49
Banking Rep. (BNA) 313, 314 (Aug. 17, 1987) [hereinafter Banking Report].
3. See infra notes 21-24, and accompanying text. In 1984 the major wire transfer
networks, Fedwire and CHIPS, handled $668 billion a day. This figure reflects an
estimated 48.4 percent increase since 1980. TIEN, RICH, & CAHN, ELECTRONIC FUND
TRANSFER SYSTEM FRAUD: COMPUTER CRIME, vi (1985) [hereinafter TIEN]. Although
wire transfers constitute only .04%o of the number of payments made throughout the
United States, they account for 78.5% of the value of payments made in the U.S.
Humphrey, Payment System Risk, Market Failure, and Public Policy, in ELECTRONIC FUNDS
TRANSFERS AND PAYMENTS: THE PUBLIC POLICY ISSUES 83, 84 (E. Solomon ed. 1987).
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merchant enters into a contract with a South American shipper that
binds the Chicago merchant to make periodic payments of $27,000 into
the shipper's Swiss bank account.4 To make the payments by wire trans-
fer, the merchant (the "sender") directs his bank in Chicago (the "send-
ing bank") to debit his account and pay $27,000 to the shipper's Swiss
account.5 Using a computer terminal, the sending bank contacts a wire
transfer network and sends the "transfer order. ' 6 In Switzerland, the
shipper's bank (the "receiving bank") receives the transfer order and
credits $27,000 to the shippers's ("beneficiary's") account. 7 Upon the
completion of the transfer, the sending and receiving banks settle the
debt between themselves. 8
Large banks and corporations favor wire transfers over traditional
payment instruments, such as checks, because wire transfers move funds
faster, more efficiently, and more conveniently.9 Most wire transfers
proceed without difficulty: the beneficiary receives the funds, the banks
settle, and the wheels of commerce turn smoothly on. Sometimes, how-
ever, problems occur that, given the size of each wire transfer, usually
result in substantial economic losses. A 1984 study of 207 wire transfer
incidents estimated the average loss at $942,450. Averaging only the
most recent years, the study estimates the potential wire transfer loss at
$1.6 million. ' 0 The causes of such "gone awry" wire transfers vary con-
siderably, ranging from simple negligence or carelessness on the part of
bank employees to fraud committed by imposters.
An example of a fraudulently initiated wire transfer with interna-
tional implications occurred on May 13, 1988, when a First Chicago
National Bank employee and six accomplices initiated three fraudulent
4. The facts of this example are derived from Evra v. Swiss Bank Corp., 673 F.2d
951 (7th Cir. 1982), cert. denied, 459 U.S. 1017 (1982) (Posner, J.) (holding conse-
quential damages unavailable when the receiving bank's failure to credit a transfer
order properly results in the plaintiff forfeiting a valuable contract).
5. The terms "sender," "sending bank" and "receiving bank" appear in Com-
ment, Risk Allocation in International Interbank Electronic Fund Transfers: CHIPS &
SWIFT, 22 HARV. INT'L. LJ. 621, 633 (1981). The term "sender" appears in Banking
Report, supra note 2, at 314.
6. A transfer order instructs a bank to pay an amount of money. See Banking
Report, supra note 2, at 313.
7. The term "beneficiary" appears in Banking Report, id. at 314. A more com-
plicated wire transfer might involve the Chicago bank sending a transfer to a London
bank which in turn would send the transfer on to the shipper's Swiss bank. The
London bank would be termed the "intermediate bank."
8. "Settle" means to pay in cash, by clearinghouse settlement, in a charge or
credit or by remittance, or as otherwise instructed. A settlement may either be provi-
sional or final. U.C.C. § 4-104(j). For purposes of this Note, "settlement" will refer
to final settlement. The method for settling wire transfers depends on the system
used to complete the transfer. Settlement may occur at the time of transfer or some-
time shortly thereafter. For a complete discussion, see Corporate Wire Transfers, 42
REc. A.B. Crry N.Y. 526, 532-38 (1987) [hereinafter RECORD].
9. RECORD, supra note 8, at 527.
10. TIEN, supra note 3, at vi.
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wire transfers sending nearly $70 million to two banks in Austria."1
Officials uncovered the fraud before the perpetrators could abscond
with the funds, but their plan nearly succeeded.' 2 In cases of fraudulent
or negligent wire transfers, courts in the United States as well as interna-
tional organizations have struggled with the issue of how to allocate
liability.
In a leading United States wire transfer case, Bradford Trust v. Texas
American Bank-Houston,13 the Fifth Circuit confronted the issue of bank
liability for fraudulent wire transfers. The court held that when a send-
ing bank wires a forged transfer order to a receiving bank which fails to
credit the account as the transfer order directs, the sending bank is lia-
ble if the forger cannot be made to answer for the loss. 14 Bradford Trust
involved two United States banks sending a wire transfer on a domestic
wire transfer system, yet the case carries important implications for the
developing international law of wire transfers.
As a leader in the use of modern wire transfer technology,' 5 the
United States sets an example both for other nations and for interna-
tional legislative bodies developing their own wire transfer law. Addi-
tionally, absent international or private agreements to the contrary,
United States law is likely to govern in many international wire transfer
disputes 16 because many electronic wire transactions involve United
States parties. 17
11. Bailey, U.S. Charges Seven in "No-Tech" Attempt to Steal $70 Million from First
Chicago, Wall St.J., May 19, 1988, at 8, col. 1.
12. Bock, "The Chairman" and His Board: Embezzlers Nearly Get Away With $69 Mil-
lion from First Chicago, TIME, May 30, 1988, at 45.
13. 790 F.2d 407 (5th Cir. 1986).
14. Id. at 407-08.
15. The largest United States wire transfer networks, Fedwire and CHIPS, have
been in operation since 1973 and 1970, respectively. RECORD, supra note 8, at 532-
34. See also infra notes 25-30 and accompanying text. The wire transfer networks of
England and France have only been operational since 1984. See also Robinson, The
Structure and Characteristics of the Principal Electronic Banking Systems, in ELECTRONIC
BANKING THE LEGAL IMPLICATIONS 5, 9 (Goode ed. 1985) [hereinafter Robinson];
Draft Legal Guide on Electronic Funds Transfers, Report of the Secretary-General at 30, U.N.
Doc. A/CN.9/266/Add.1 (1985) [hereinafter Draft]. See infra notes 31-34 and accom-
panying text. SWIFT, a wire transfer network organized privately by several interna-
tional banks, is the only wire transfer network based outside the U.S. which has
operated more than five years. Robinson, supra, at 12. See also infra notes 35-36 and
accompanying text.
16. An interesting choice of law issue arises when a U.S. bank is a party to the
action. It may be resolved by looking to the state where the bank has the greatest
business connections or by other methods. Because the issue is beyond the scope of
this Note it will not be addressed in further detail.
17. While no available figures indicate the relative number of U.S. entities send-
ing wire transfers, one could reasonably assume that the number is significant. The
prominent position of the U.S. in world banking suggests that a large percentage of
wire transfers would likely involve American entities. See STATISTICAL ABSTRACT OF
THE UNITED STATES 474 (106 ed. 1988) (U.S. banks represent 20.4%o of the world's
500 largest banks and hold 11.4% of the total deposits). See also Patrikis, Global EFT
Guidelines: What They Can Mean to U. S. Banks, BANK ADMINISTRATION Sept., 1987, at
30 ("Most U.S. banks are asked to transfer funds internationally at one time or
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Indicative of the growing international interest in wire transfers, the
United Nations Commission on International Trade Law has been inves-
tigating wire transfers law for several years.' 8
This Note investigates the allocation of liability when fraud or negli-
gence in a wire transfer leads to a loss. Specifically, the Note analyzes
methods for assessing liability where a sending bank negligently sends a
transfer order containing a discrepancy between account number and
account name, and the receiving bank credits the account corresponding
to the number despite this discrepancy. After surveying the limited
background of United States wire transfer case law, Part One of this
Note concludes that the law which does exist is both confused and mal-
formed. Part Two examines two recent proposals to modify the law of
wire transfers-the work of the United Nations Commission on Interna-
tional Trade Law, and the approach taken in the new proposal for the
Uniform Commercial Code, Article 4A. Part Three analyzes the Bradford
Trust opinion and concludes it was wrongly decided, from both a legal
and a policy perspective. Because the court in Bradford Trust and the UN
Commission's Legal Guide advocate a similar rule of sending bank lia-
bility, the Bradford Trust decision provides an excellent vehicle for con-
sidering emerging international law. Finally, in Part Four, this Note
advocates the approach articulated by the drafters of the newly updated
Uniform Commercial Code, which places liability on the receiving bank.
I. Background
The law governing wire transfers is in disarray.' 9 Legal rights and
responsibilities in transfer cases often depend on where the plaintiff files
suit.20 There is no current international law governing wire transfers,
nor is there any international agreement stipulating which jurisdiction's
law will govern international wire transfer disputes. The current United
States case law addressing wire transfers is thin, but as wire transfers
become more common, so will disputes. Courts and legislatures will be
called upon to fashion law for this important area.
A. Wire Transfer Systems
Wire transfers have existed since the invention of the telegraph, 2 ' but
modern banks execute wire transfers using complex computer sys-
tems. 22 These computers link banks in a computer network which make
another, and most have had the experience of receiving payments from abroad for a
customer's account"). Id.
18. See infra Part II.A.
19. See, e.g., 1J. WHITE & R. SUMMERS, UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE 809 (Practi-
tioner's ed. 1988) [hereinafter WHITE & SUMMERS]; Tallackson supra note 1, at 663-
66.
20. Note, New SWIFT Rules on the Liability of Financial Institutions for Interest Losses
Caused by Delay in International Funds Transfers, 13 CORNELL INT'L LJ. 311, 316 (1980).
21. Tallackson, supra note I, at 639.
22. RECORD, supra note 8, at 531.
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it possible to transfer funds and settle accounts with remarkable
speed. 23 The advent of these modem systems explains the increased
use of wire transfers as a method of payment. 24
Fedwire and Clearing House Interbank Payments System
("CHIPS") are the two most important United States based wire transfer
networks. 25 The twelve Federal Reserve Banks own and operate
Fedwire, the largest American wire transfer network. 2 6 Fedwire pro-
vides communication and settlement services to all United States com-
mercial banks and thrift institutions. 2 7 CHIPS is owned and operated by
the New York Clearing House Association and handles ninety-five per-
cent of the international transfers made in dollars.28 CHIPS' member-
ship is limited to 120 banks worldwide,2 9 but non-member banks who
maintain a relationship with a CHIPS member can use the network. 30
European banks share three wire transfer networks. The Clearing
House Automated Payment System ("CHAPS") is the United King-
dom's wire transfer network, 3 ' and is the most important system for
payments in the British pound sterling.3 2 The Sy~stme automatique de
gention int~gr6 par t616transmission de transactions avec imputation du
r~glements Etranger" ("SAGITTAIRE") is the French wire transfer net-
work,33 and provides the French link for most international transfers in
the franc.3 4 The last major network, the Society for Worldwide Interna-
tional Financial Telecommunications ("SWIFT"), is a privately operated
non-profit society organized under Belgian law.35 SWIFT member
banks are located throughout North and Latin America, Western
Europe, Japan, and Southeast Asia.3 6 Central banks in West Germany,
23. See VERGARI & SHUE, supra note 1, at 524. See also Comment, Risk Allocation in
International Interbank Electronic Funds Transfers: CHIPS & SWIFT, 22 HARv. INT'L L.J.
621 n.1 (1981).
24. See Scott, Corporate Wire Transfers and the Unifonn New Payments Code, 83 COLUM.
L. REV. 1664, 1678 (1983) ("... the amount of money moved by wire [has grown]
geometrically in response to technological change...").
25. Banking Report, supra note 2, at 314 ("Most wire transfers currently take
place on either [Fedwire or CHIPS] . .
26. RECORD, supra note 8, at 532.
27. N. PENNEY & D. BAKER, THE LAW OF ELECTRONIC FUND TRANSFER SYSTEMS 9-
4. (Supp. 1986) [hereinafter PENNEY & BAKER].
28. Id. See also, Banking Report, supra note 2, at 315.
29. RECORD, supra note 8, at 534. Half of the CHIPS members are U.S. banks, the
remainder are U.S. branches of foreign banks or Edge Act Corporations. Id. "[A]n
Edge Act corporation is a bank subsidiary that specializes in transacting in interna-
tional business and finance." VERGARI & SHUE, supra note 1, at 525-26. The Edge
Act is codified at 12 U.S.C. § 611 et seq. (1982).
30. RECORD, supra note 8, at 534.
31. Draft, supra note 15, at 31.
32. Frankel & Marquardt, International Payments and EFT Links, in ELECTRONIC
FUNDS TRANSFERS AND PAYMENTS: THE PUBLIC POLICY ISSUES 111, 113 (E. Solomon
ed. 1987).
33. Draft, supra note 15, at 30.
34. Id.
35. RECORD, supra note 8, at 536.
36. Id.
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Japan, the Netherlands, and Switzerland are currently developing their
own modem wire transfer networks.3 7 Many banks also send wire trans-
fers on public communications systems such as telex.3
8
B. United States Governing Law-Legislative
Given the particular importance of wire transfers to the United States
banking community, one might think that American legislatures would
have given careful attention to regulations for wire transfers. Surpris-
ingly, United States legislative bodies have regulated most other forms
of payment, but have neglected wire transfers.3 9 This is particularly
ironic given the volume of payments made in this manner and the poten-
tial liability involved.40
1. Federal Law and Regulations
Limited statutory and regulatory coverage dominates the federal regula-
tory picture surrounding wire transfers. In 1978, Congress enacted the
Electronic Funds Transfers Act 4 ' in reaction to the increasing preva-
lence of automatic teller machines. 42 Since the act was primarily con-
cerned with providing safeguards in consumer-oriented transactions, it
did not address wire transfers. 43
The Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System, under the
authority of the Federal Reserve Act, issues regulations governing the
operation of the Federal Reserve Banks. Federal Reserve System "Reg-
ulation J" governs wire transfers, 4 4 but its effect is limited. First, the
regulation only applies to Fedwire transfers, leaving most international
wire transfers unregulated. 4 5 Second, Regulation J does not provide a
comprehensive scheme governing wire transfers, but instead focuses on
the rights of the Federal Reserve Banks. 46 For example, Regulation J
includes language authorizing reserve banks to debit and credit
37. Frankel & Marquardt, supra note 32, at 113.
38. Scott, supra note 24, at 1669. Certain other wire transfer networks have not
been successful. See PENNY & BAKER, supra note 27, at 9-10 (discussing the demise of
the Bankwire system).
39. See Scott, supra note 24, at 1664. Other payment transactions are regulated by
federal and state electronic funds transfer laws, the Consumer Credit Protection Act,
15 U.S.C §§ 1601-1667(e) (1982), and Articles 3 and 4 of the Uniform Commercial
Code.
40. Scott, supra note 24, at 1664.
41. 15 U.S.C. §§ 1693-1693r (1982).
42. See 15 U.S.C. § 1693 (1982) ("The primary objective of this subchapter, how-
ever, is the provision of individual consumer rights."); Note, The Courts and CHIPS,
SWIFT & Fedwire: A Proposal for Filling the Regulatory Gap, 2 INrT'L PROPERTY J. 289
(1984).
43. 15 U.S.C. § 1693(a)(6) (1982). Subsection (a)(6) of the Act specifically
excludes wire transfer from the statutes's scope. See also Federal Reserve System
Regulation E, 12 C.F.R § 205.3(b) (1988); Note, supra note 42.
44. 12 C.F.R. 210.25-210.38 (1988).
45. Tallackson, supra note 1, at 640.
46. Id. at 741.
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accounts, but it contains no provisions for determining the rights and
obligations of the transferor and the transferee.4 7
2. State Law-Uniform Commercial Code
Articles 3 and 4 of the Uniform Commercial Code ("U.C.C.") are the
most important state statutes governing payments. Some parties before
courts contend that these statutes apply to wire transfers, but most
courts follow Delbrueck & Co. v. Manufacturers Hanover Trust Co.4 8 which
held that "the U.C.C. is not applicable [to wire transfers] because [it]
does not specifically address the problem of electronic funds trans-
fers."' 4 9 Generally, commentators addressing this issue conclude that
Article 3 (on commercial paper) and Article 4 (on bank deposits) apply
only to written instruments. 50 One influential commentary on the
U.C.C. argues that Articles 3 and 4 fit wire transfer transactions "most
imperfectly" and suggests that courts should resist applying the U.C.C.
to the problems of modern wire transfers. 5 1
As electronic funds transfer payments became more widely used,
the Permanent Editorial Board of the U.C.C. became more concerned
with the gap in the Code's coverage. In 1977, it created the "3-4-8
Committee" to devise a method of handling electronic funds trans-
fers.5 2 The 3-4-8 Committee formulated the Uniform New Payments
Code ("NPC"), which attempted to unify the law governing all non-cash
payment mechanisms under one statutory scheme. 5 3 The NPC's draft-
ers designed it not only to govern wire transfers and other electronic
funds transfer mechanisms, but also to replace much of Articles 3 and
4.54
Ultimately, the NPC failed to find support. In 1985, the National
Conference of Commissioners on Uniform State Law, the American Law
47. Id. at 542. The Federal Reserve Board has promised to study whether a bank
may justifiably "rely on account number[s] when posting transactions." 51 Fed. Reg.
43087.
48. Delbrueck & Co. v. Manufacturers Hanover Trust Co., 609 F.2d 1047 (2d Cir.
1979).
49. Id. See also Evra Corp. v. Swiss Bank Corp., 673 F.2d 951 (7th Cir. 1982), cert
denied, 459 U.S. 1017 (1983) (U.C.C. inapplicable), and Walker v. Texas Commerce
Bank, N.A., 635 F. Supp. 678 (S.D. Tex. 1986) (U.C.C. inapplicable); Houston Con-
tracting Co. v. Chase Manhattan Bank, N.A., 539 F. Supp. 247, 249 (S.D.N.Y. 1982)
("telexed payment order.., is not a 'demand item' "as defined by the U.C.C.; there-
fore, bank not liable for loss under U.C.C.).
50. WHrTE & SUMMERS, supra note 19, at 809-10. Tallackson, supra note 1, at 641-
2. Georgia and Florida have amended their versions of the U.C.C. specifically to
include electronic funds transfers in the definition of an item governed by the Code.
Fla. Stat. Ann. § 67 4.104(1)(g) (West Supp. 1988); Ga. Code Ann. § 11-4-104(1) (g)
(1982).
51. WHRITE & SUMMERS, supra note 19, at 809-10.
52. H. Scott, An Introduction to the Uniform New Payments Code, in Memoran-
dum to the National Conference of Commissioners on Uniform State Laws I (June
15, 1983).
53. Miller, Report on the New Payments Code, 41 Bus. LAWYER 1007, 1007-08 (1986).
54. Tallackson, supra note 1, at 665.
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Institute, and the Permanent Editorial Board of the U.C.C. all agreed to
discontinue work on the new Code. 5 5 There are two possible explana-
tions for the NPC's failure. First, it "propos[ed] to fix ... that which
[was] not broken" by rewriting the law of paper based transactions. 56
Second, it sought to force all payment mechanisms to conform to the
same rules, a goal which many commentators believe is undesirable. 5 7
After the NPC failed, the Uniform Commissioners decided to scale
down their efforts. They began two separate projects: first, to revise
Articles 3 and 4 and second, to draft a new statute governing wire trans-
fers.5 8 The new wire transfer statute, Article 4A, is still in its drafting
stage. Nevertheless, it represents the most recent effort to produce
comprehensive legislation governing wire transfers.5 9
C. United States Governing Law-Cases
Since federal and state legislatures have failed to articulate liability rules
governing wire transfers when both the transmitting and receiving banks
are negligent, courts must fashion the law without statutory guidance. 60
Only two American courts have heard wire transfer cases involving neg-
ligent sending and receiving of a transfer order with a discrepancy
between account name and number. The Northern District of Illinois
ruled in two cases that the sending bank may shift the loss to the receiv-
ing bank in some circumstances. The Fifth Circuit, however, reached
the opposite conclusion. It ruled that when the sending bank sends a
wire transfer with a discrepancy between account name and number,
which the receiving bank honors by paying the account designated by
the number, the sending bank cannot shift its loss to the receiving bank.
1. Northern District of Illinois
The first Northern District of Illinois case was Securities Fund Services v.
American National Bank.6 ' In Securities Fund, the sending bank plaintiff
accepted forged instructions purporting to bear the signature of one
John Bushman. The request directed the sending bank to redeem Bush-
man's shares in a fund and transfer the proceeds to an account at the
receiving bank. Pursuant to these instructions the sending bank issued a
transfer order to the receiving bank directing it to deposit
$2,017,867.50 in the account of "John Bushman Trustee// 204471."62
The receiving bank credited account 204471, but this was not John
Bushman's account. Bushman had no account with the receiving bank
in either an individual or trustee capacity, and the money was not recov-
55. Id. at 665-66. See also, Miller, supra note 53, at 1007, 1010.
56. Tallackson, supra note 1, at 665.
57. Id. at 665-66. The recent efforts toward redrafting U.C.C. Articles 3 and 4
indicate that the second explanation is more likely correct.
58. Miller, supra note 53, at 1007, 1010.
59. Banking Report, supra note 2, at 314.
60. WHITE & SUMMERS, supra note 19, at 809-10.
61. 542 F. Supp. 323 (N.D. Ill. 1982).
62. Id. at 325.
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ered. Upon discovery of the fraud, the sending bank reissued the
redeemed shares to Bushman and sued the receiving bank to recover the
mistakenly transferred funds.63 Ruling on the receiving bank's summary
judgment motion, the Northern District of Illinois dismissed counts
sounding in bailment, conversion, and estoppel, but allowed claims in
agency and negligence, and on a third-party-beneficiary theory.64
The court held that the sending bank could prove that the receiving
bank was either its agent or, that the sending bank was the receiving
bank's customer by analogy to U.C.C. section 4-104(e). 65 Under either
theory, the receiving bank owed a duty of reasonable care to the sending
bank. Thus, the receiving bank's alleged failure to notice the discrep-
ancy between account name and number created a cause of action.66
The court reasoned that the sending bank must receive a direct benefit
from the receiving bank in order to establish a third party beneficiary
claim.6 7 Viewing the facts most favorably to Securities Fund Services,
the court found that the sending bank was a beneficiary of any contract
to transfer funds between American National Bank and an intermediate
bank. The sending bank benefitted because a properly conducted trans-
fer prevents any loss to the bank or its customers. 68
One year later, the same court heard a case with facts virtually iden-
tical to Securities Fund. In Shearson/American Express v. American National
Bank,6 9 the sending bank sued the receiving bank for a one million dol-
lar loss, charging negligence, breach of contract, breach of agency,
breach of bailment duties, conversion, and estoppel. On the receiving
bank's motion for summary judgment, the court dismissed the bailment
and conversion counts. In contrast to its decision in Securities Fund, how-
ever, the Shearson court expressly rejected the Securities Fund holding on
the estoppel issue,70 ruling that the sending bank detrimentally relied
on the receiving bank's silence and inaction in handling the fraudulent
transfer order.7 1 Because the receiving bank "failed to make sufficient
inquires or give sufficient notice... regarding the discrepancy between
the named recipient of the [wire transfer] and the designated account
63. Id.
64. Id. at 326-29.
65. U.C.C. § 4-104(l)(e) reads as follows: "'Customer' means any person having
an account with a bank or for whom a bank has agreed to collect items and includes a
bank carrying an account with another bank."
66. Securities Fund, 542 F. Supp. at 327.
67. Id
68. Id. at 329.
69. No. 83-C-0555 (N.D. Ill Aug. 18, 1983) (LEXIS, Genfed library, Dist. file). In
this case, Shearson directed Chemical Bank to wire $1 million to American National
Bank ("ANB") in Chicago. The transfer order indicated "Irving Mazer" as the bene-
ficiary of the wire transfer with the account number 244074. Account number
244074 belonged to "Phone Bat-Terry Ltd." and not Irving Mazer who had no
account with ANB. ANB credited the account by the number anyway without discov-
ering the transfer order's discrepancy.
70. Id
71. Id.
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number," 7 2 the court stated that estoppel doctrine prevented it from
"maintaining silence when it [had a] duty to speak, or claim the benefit
of [its] own negligence .... 73
The split between Shearson and Securities Fund on the estoppel issue
is significant for two reasons. First, it provides evidence of the confu-
sion in the law. Two courts in the same district, addressing virtually
identical facts, reached two different results. Second, the split illustrates
the extent of the dispute over the proper characterization of the rela-
tionship between sending and receiving banks. In each case, the court
held that it was appropriate to apply the law of negligence and agency.
In Shearson, however, the court found that even in the absence of a for-
mal contract between the sending and receiving bank, a receiving bank
is estopped to deny the existence of a contract when it behaves as if a
contract existed.
2. Fifth Circuit-Bradford Trust
The Fifth Circuit heard Bradford Trust v. Texas American Bank-Houston,74
the first federal court of appeals case addressing the problem of account
name and number discrepancies in wire transfers. Two con artists
agreed to purchase nearly $800,000 worth of rare coins and gold bullion
from Colonial Coin, a Houston merchant. They agreed with Colonial to
wire payment to Colonial's account at Southern Bank, the receiving
bank.7 5 The con men then sent a forged letter to the sender, State
Street Bank, a Boston financial institution that was the agent of a mutual
fund. The forged letter directed the sending bank to liquidate $800,000
from Frank Rochefort's account and wire the funds to the receiving bank
for the account "Frank Rochefort, account number of 057-141"; this was
Colonial's account. The sending bank, without complying with its own
internal security procedures, directed its correspondent bank to send
the transfer order to the receiving bank.76
The transfer was sent on Fedwire and read "... Frank Rochnefort
Jr. Acct. 057-141[.]" 77 Without noticing the discrepancy between the
account name and number, the receiving bank credited account 057-
141, even though Rochefort had no account at that bank. It then tele-
phoned Colonial, informing the coin merchant that it received and
credited the transfer. Colonial then released the merchandise to the con
72. Id.
73. Id. (quoting People v. Michigan Avenue Trust Co., 233 II. App. 428 (1924)).
74. 790 F.2d 407 (5th Cir. 1986).
75. Id. at 408. Prior to litigation, Southern Bank changed its name to Texas
American Bank-Houston. In this Note, the bank will be referred to as Southern
Bank.
76. Id. A correspondent bank is a financial organization "which regularly per-
forms services for another [financial organization] in a place or market to which the
other does not have direct access." BLACK's LAw DICTONARY 311 (5th ed. 1979).
77. Bradford Trust, 790 F.2d at 408 n.4. State Street Bank also misspelled Roche-
fort's name in the transfer order, an error that went undetected by both banks. Id.
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artists. 78 The fraud was discovered when the real Frank Rochefort
received notice of the withdrawal and informed Bradford it was unau-
thorized. The sending bank reinstated Rochefort's account and sued
the receiving bank to recover the transferred funds, claiming breach of
contract, negligence, conversion, and mistake. 79 At trial, the Southern
District of Texas found both the sending and receiving banks acted neg-
ligently. Applying the Texas comparative negligence statute, the court
apportioned the loss equally between the two institutions.8 0
On appeal to the Fifth Circuit, each bank claimed the other was the
primary cause of the loss and should therefore bear the entire loss. 8 1
The Fifth Circuit reversed and ruled the sending bank must bear the
entire loss. 8
2
The Fifth Circuit also ruled that, while the U.C.C. itself did not
apply to wire transfers, courts could draw analogies to the U.C.C. to
help resolve the issues presented.8 3 The court extracted two policy
arguments from the U.C.C. which dictated that the sending bank must
bear the loss. The first policy is that the party in the best position to
avoid the loss should bear the liability.8 4 The court reasoned that since
the sending bank dealt most directly with the forgers, it could most ably
avoid the loss. 8 5 Second, the court's solution should promote finality in
commercial transactions.8 6 The court argued that it is "highly desire-
able to end the transactions on an instrument when it is paid rather then
reopen and upset a series of commercial transactions at a later date
when the forgery is discovered." T8 7 The court concluded that assigning
liability to the sending bank avoided the need to reopen the transaction
78. Id. at 408. Colonial released the coins and gold bullion to the con men.
Neither the merchandise nor the transferred funds were recovered. Id.
79. IME The district court dismissed Bradford's claim against Colonial.
80. Id. at 408; Bradford Trust v. Texas American Bank-Houston, No. H-81-2144
(S.D. Tex. Oct. 3, 1983) (LEXIS, Genfed library, Dist. file).
81. Bradford Trust, 790 F.2d at 408.
82. Id. The Fifth Circuit determined the trial court improperly applied the Texas
comparative negligence statute. While acknowledging that the law in Texas included
comparative negligence, the court ruled that the statute extended only to actions "to
recover damages resulting in death or injury to persons or property." Id. Thus the
statute applied to physical rather than economic harms. Id. at 409 (quoting Texas
Statutes Ann., art. 2212a). While this statute has been repealed, the Texas legisla-
ture enacted a substantially identical law codified at Tex. Civ. Prac. & Rem. Code
Ann. § 33.001 (Vernon 1986). See also Bradford Trust, 790 F.2d at 408 n.I.
83. Bradford Trust, 790 F.2d at 409. The Fifth Circuit followed the Second Cir-
cuit's approach in Delbrueck & Co. v. Manufacturers Hanover Trust Co., 609 F.2d
1047 (2d Cir. 1979), holding that "[t]he U.C.C. does not specifically address the
problems of electronic funds transfers. However, analogous use of[U.C.C.] concepts
." is permitted. Id. at 1051.
84. Bradford Trust, 790 F.2d at 409.
85. Id. at 410.
86. Id. at 409.
87. Bradford Trust, 790 F.2d at 411 quoting U.C.C. § 3-418, comment 1. The
Court also cited Price v. Neal, 3 Burr. 1354 (K.B. 1762), which holds that a drawee
who pays on a negotiable instrument with a forged signature cannot recover his pay-
ment. Id.
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and best served the policy of finality.8 8
H. Alternative Approaches
The approaches taken by the Northern District of Illinois and the Fifth
Circuit represent the current state of fraudulent wire transfer law in the
United States. Two alternative approaches have been proposed
addressing the issue of liability for payment on a wire transfer contain-
ing a discrepancy. Both the United Nations Commission on Interna-
tional Trade Law ("UNCITRAL") and the Permanent Editorial Board of
the U.C.C. have studied wire transfer issues for several years.89 UNCI-
TRAL recently published a legal guide to problems in the law of interna-
tional wire transfers. The guide takes no clear position on assignment
of liability when loss results because of an inconsistent transfer order.
Yet the guide's tone suggests its drafters favor the Bradford Trust rule of
sending bank liability.90 The Permanent Editorial Board of the U.C.C.
takes a different approach in Article 4A. It rejects the Bradford Trust rule
and assigns liability to the receiving bank when it credits a transfer order
with a discrepancy between account name and number.
88. Bradford Trust, 790 F.2d at 411.
89. The General Assembly placed electronic funds transfers on UNCITRAL's pri-
ority list in 1978. Patrikis, supra note 17, at 30-3 1. The Permanent Editorial Board of
the U.C.C. created the 3-4-8 committee to address issues arising in electronic funds
transfers in 1977. See also H. Scott, supra note 52.
90. See U.N. LEGAL GUIDE, U.N. Doc. A/CN.9/250/Add.3 (1985) [hereinafter
LEGAL GUIDE]. Based on the research conducted for the Legal Guide, UNCITRAL
also authorized the Working Group on International Payments to prepare draft
model rules for electronic funds transfer. UNCITRAL published a recent draft of
these rules on October 3, 1988. U.N. DRAFr MODEL RULES, U.N. Doc.
A/CN.9/WG.IV/WP.39. See U.N. Doc. A/41/17. The Commission hoped the Draft
Model Rules would encourage the development of uniform rules governing elec-
tronic funds transfers. Unfortunately, on the issue of name and number discrepan-
cies, the position of Draft Model Rules is even less clear than that of the Legal Guide.
The writers of the Draft Model Rules have proposed two alternatives. Alternative A
reads as follows:
If a data element is represented by any combination of words, figures or
codes and there is a discrepancy between them, the receiving bank may con-
sider each form of representation to be equally valid, unless the bank knew or
ought to have known of the discrepancy.
U.N. DRAFr MODEL RULES, Article 3, Alternative A. U.N. Doc. A/CN.9/WG.IV/
WP.39, at 8.
Alternative B states:
If the account that is debited or credited is expressed both by the name of the
account holder and by an account number and there is a discrepancy between
them, the account to be debited or credited is considered to be the account as
expressed by name.
U.N. DRAFTr MODEL RULES, Article 3(4), Alternative B. U.N. Doc.
A/CN.9/WG.IV/WP.39, at 9.
One can argue that a receiving bank when faced with a transfer order with a name
an number discrepancy ought to know that something in the transfer is amiss. This
Note makes precisely this argument in section III.C, infra. Thus, the drafters of the
Model Rules failed to decide directly the issue of name and number discrepancies,
preferring instead to leave this problem in the hands of the national legislatures.
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A. UNCITRAL Legal Guide
In 1982, a report of the United Nations Secretary-General concluded
that electronic funds transfers had developed in a "partial legal vac-
uum."9 1 The Secretary-General requested UNCITRAL to study the
matter and prepare a legal guide to the problems of electronic funds
transfers. 9 2 The UNCITRAL Working Group identified legal problems
associated with electronic funds transfers and created the Draft Legal
Guide on Electronic Funds Transfers [hereinafter Legal Guide] to assist
national legislative bodies in developing their own wire transfer regula-
tions.9 3 While the Legal Guide is not law, its discussion could form the
basis for future legislation addressing problems in the law of wire
transfers .94
The Legal Guide's chapter on private agreements for transferring
funds discusses issues arising when a sending bank presents a receiving
bank with a transfer order containing a discrepancy between an account
name and number.95 The Legal Guide concludes that allowing banks to
rely on account number alone is more efficient than comparing the
account name and number and more reliable than examining only the
account name.96 Banks often rely solely on numbers when sorting and
routing funds to accounts. The Legal Guide concludes that "a fast, reli-
able and inexpensive electronic funds transfer system would clearly be
furthered by enabling banks to rely entirely upon the account number
after receiving a transfer instruction." 97
91. U.N. Doc. A/CN.9/221, at 23 (1982).
92. Id. at 23-24.
93. Id. at 24. The Working Group submitted draft chapters of the Guide at
UNCITRAL's seventeenth and eighteenth sessions. U.N. Doc. A/CN.9/266/Add. I-
2 (1985).
94. See LEGAL GUIDE, supra note 90, at 2 ("This legal guide has been prepared to
aid legislators and lawyers considering the rules for particular networks.") Some
commentators have also suggested the United Nations's Draft Convention on Inter-
national Bills of Exchange and International Promissory Notes should govern wire
transfers. See, e.g., Patrikis, supra note 17, at 30. This Note will not address the Draft
convention for two reasons. First, the United Nations General Assembly has not yet
ratified the Convention. Even if the General Assembly had notified the convention,
each nation using wire transfers would have to adopt the Convention before it
became binding. id. Second, the extent to which the Draft Convention will govern
electronic funds transfers, even if ratified, remains unclear. Article Three of the
Draft Convention expressly refers to "written instruments" and the drafters chose to
leave "written" undefined "so that it could be interpreted in accordance with evolv-
ing practices and technological developments." U.N. Doc. A/41/17, 16-17 (Aug. 11,
1986). UNCITRAL's development of the Legal Guide and the Draft Model Rules
suggests that UNCITRAL did not intend the Draft Convention to govern wire
transfers.
95. LEGAL GUIDE, supra note 90, at 14-15 and U.N. Doc. A/CN.9/266/Add.2
(1985) at 27-28. The Legal Guide specifically addresses name/number discrepan-
cies. Id.
96. LEGAL GUIDE, supra note 90, at 14-15.
97. Id. at 15. For a discussion of the use of account numbers in the checking
context, see Note, Computerized Check Processing and a Bank's Duty to Use Ordinary Care,
65 TEx. L. REV. 1173 (1987) (concluding that courts should evaluate a bank's general
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Another section of the Legal Guide discussing name and number
discrepancies suggests that "in [the] case of conflict between the
account number and account name, the account number prevail[s]". 9 8
This rule parallels the Bradford Trust rule, dictating that the sending bank
would be liable when it sends a transfer order containing a name and
number discrepancy. The Legal Guide effectively immunizes receiving
banks, since it mandates that they rely upon the account number alone
in the case of name and number discrepancy. The Legal Guide acknowl-
edges that the opposite rule has merits,9 9 but the Guide's tone betrays
the drafters preference for sending bank liability. The Legal Guide
states that if the "loss were attributable to the transferee bank, it would
be a recognition that the loss could have been prevented by the subse-
quent action of the transferee bank."' 0 0 The Legal Guide concludes,
"[t]he normal rule in such a case would probably be the transferor bore
the risk of such loss."'' 1
B. Article 4A
On August 10, 1987 a committee created by the National Conference of
Commissioners on Uniform State Laws and the American Law Institute
unveiled its discussion draft of Article 4A, the proposed addition to the
Uniform Commercial Code, designed specifically to govern wire trans-
fers. 10 2 While the drafting of Article 4A is still in its preliminary stages,
it represents the only current comprehensive attempt to create uniform
wire transfer law in the United States. The 1987 draft of 4A places lia-
bility on the receiving bank when it accepts a transfer order in which the
account name and number do not match. '0 3 The 4A approach of receiv-
ing bank liability, therefore, stands opposite the sending bank liability
rule of Bradford Trust and the UNCITRAL Legal Guide.
III. Analysis of Bradford Trust and Sending Bank Liability.
This Note argues that the receiving bank liability rule of Article 4A rep-
resents the fairest and most efficient method for allocating blame in
cases of gone-awry wire transfers. In reaching this conclusion, Part IV
utilizes the Bradford Trust decision as a vehicle for analyzing the weak-
nesses of the sending-bank liability rule. Since the Bradford Trust Court
and the UNCITRAL Legal Guide both embrace sending-bank liability,
consideration of Bradford Trust provides important insights to develop-
ing international law. As the United States, foreign nations, and interna-
tional bodies develop wire transfer law, they can, and should, look to
duty of ordinary care by focusing on whether a bank's use of a computerized check
processing system was reasonable in light of established banking practices).
98. U.N. Doc. A/CN.9/266/Add.2, at 28 (1985).
99. Id.; LEGAL GUIDE, supra note 90, at 14.
100. Id. at 28; U.N. Doc. A/CN.9/266/Add.2, at 28 (1985).
101. Id.
102. Banking Report, supra note 2, at 313.
103. WHITE & SUMMERS, supra note 19, at 814.
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Bradford Trust as an analytical starting point from which to develop the
law of wire transfers.
A. Inappropriateness of Comparative Negligence
The Bradford Trust court correctly concluded that comparative negli-
gence does not apply to wire transfers.' 0 4 As the court noted, the pri-
mary reason for comparative negligence is to "avoid the harsh
distributional results of precluding recovery of the slightly negligent
plaintiff who has suffered a devastating loss."105 The court argued that
in the commercial banking world where "risks can be priced or shifted
to others,"' 0 6 the traditional rationale for comparative negligence is
unconvincing. 10 7 Professor Hal Scott, a prominent authority on wire
transfer law, agrees that comparative negligence should not apply and
argues that fund transfers can be most effectively insured when the risks
are clearly identified and assigned.10 8 Finally, a contributory negligence
regime avoids long expensive trials where each party attempts to prove
the other's relative fault.
B. Inapplicability of the U.C.C.
The Bradford Trust court concluded that U.C.C. Articles 3 and 4 do not
directly apply to wire transfers. Case law on this point is nearly settled
as Delbrueck v. Manufactures Hanover Trust 109 and other cases make
clear.1 10 Most commentators also agree that courts should not directly
apply the U.C.C. to wire transfers."'
104. Bradford Trust, 790 F.2d at 409. The Fifth Circuit addressed for the first time
the applicability of the statute to wire transfer cases and refused to read the statute
broadly enough to include economic damages. Id.
105. Id. (citing PROSSER AND KEATON, THE LAW OF TORTS 469 (5th ed. 1984)).
106. Bradford Trust, 790 F.2d at 409.
107. Id. In the case of accidents, risks cannot be allocated between the parties in
advance because it is impossible for every potential victim to contract with every
potential injurer. This reasoning does not apply to wire transfers because banks
sending and receiving transfer orders must contact one another prior to transmis-
sion. Since each bank has the opportunity to assign liability prior to engaging wire
transfers, an argument in favor of comparative negligence loses much of its force. See
generally PROSSER & KEETON, supra note 105, at 482-84.
108. Scott, supra note 24, at 1715. "An insurance system works best if premiums
can be calculated against the background of a system of rules in which risks are iden-
tified and assigned."
109. See, e.g., Delbrueck & Co. v. Manufacturers Hanover Trust Co., 609 F.2d 1047
(2d Cir. 1979).
110. Evra Corp. v. Swiss Bank Corp., 673 F.2d 951 (7th Cir. 1982), cert denied, 459
U.S. 1017 (1983); Houston Contracting Co. v. Chase Manhattan Bank, N.A., 539 F.
Supp. 247 (S.D.N.Y. 1982); Walker v. Texas Commerce Bank, 635 F. Supp. 673,
(S.D.Tex. 1986). The Walker Court held the day before Bradford Trust was decided
that "article 4 could be stretched to encompass wire transfers, but such application
was not within the contemplation of the draftsmen." Id. at 681.
111. See, e.g., WHrrE &SUMMERS, supra note 19, at 8I0-11; Talackson, supra note 1,
at 641-2.
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C. Inappropriateness of Analogy to the U.C.C.
Despite its recognition that the U.C.C. was not directly applicable, an
analogy to the U.C.C. is at the heart of the fifth-circuit decision in Brad-
ford Trust. Analogy to the U.C.C., however, provides an unsatisfactory
framework for resolving wire transfer cases.
1. Party in the Best Position to Avoid the Loss
The Bradford Trust court begins its analogy by asserting that the party in
the best position to avoid the loss should bear liability.' 12 Comment 3
to U.C.C. section 3-417 seems to agree with the Bradford Trust reasoning
that the party dealing most directly with the imposter should bear any
loss caused by fraudulent transactions. 1 3
Closer examination of the U.C.C., however, indicates that the draft-
ers did not entirely accept this rationale. Section 3-418, addressing
finality of payment, states that "acceptance of any instrument is final in
favor of a holder in due course or a person who in good faith has
changed his position in reliance on the payment." ' 1 4 The Official Com-
ments suggest that the drafters intended to adopt the Price v. Neal rule:
"a drawee who accepts or pays on any instrument on which the signa-
ture of the drawer is forged is bound on his acceptance and cannot
recover back his payment." 115 The comment acknowledges that the
"traditional justification for this result was the drawee is in a superior
position to detect a forgery because he has the maker's signature and is
expected to know and compare it ... , 116, but labels this rationale "fic-
tional."" 1 7 At least one court has argued that while in the days of Price v.
Neal (a 1762 case) check transactions were "face-to-face," modem check
processing proceeds at such a frantic pace that there is too little time to
inspect signatures.' 18 If the archaic reasoning of Price v. Neal is inappli-
cable even to modem check processing, its application to wire transac-
tions is especially misplaced. In wire transactions, speed is an important
goal of the system. To an even greater degree than a drawee in a mod-
112. Bradford Trust, 790 F.2d at 409.
113. Id. at 410. Comment 3 to U.C.C. section 3-417 states: "the party who accepts
or pays does not 'admit' the genuineness of indorsements, and may recover from the
person presenting the instrument when they turn out to be forged. The justification
for the distinction between forgery of the signature and forgery of an indorsement is
that the drawee is in a position to verify the drawer's signature by comparison with
one in his hands, but has ordinarily no opportunity to verify an indorsement."
114. U.C.C. § 3-418. "A holder in due course is a holder who takes the instrument
(a) for value; and (b) in good faith; and (c) without notice that it is overdue or has
been dishonored or of any defense against or claim to it on the part of any person."
U.C.C. § 3-302.
115. U.C.C. § 3-418, comment 1. See also note 87.
116. Id.
117. Id.
118. Perini Corp. v. First National Bank, 553 F.2d 398, 405 (5th Cir 1977). In
1984, the Wall Street Journal estimated that 100 million checks were written in the
United States each day, making the face-to-face approach inefficient and impractical.
Wall St.J., Mar. 6, 1984 at 37, col. 3.
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ern check transaction, a sending bank in a wire transaction is in a poor
position to police potential discrepancies.
2. Finality in Transactions
The Bradford Trust court also emphasized the policy of finality articulated
in U.C.C. Section 3-418.119 Under Section 3-418, acceptance of a nego-
tiable instrument is final if it is done in good faith by a holder in due
course. 1 20 The Code only protects parties who accept negotiable instru-
ments as holders in due course, and it is possible to be a holder without
being a holder in due course.1 21 To analogize properly to the U.C.C.
finality policy, the Bradford Trust court should have considered whether
the receiving bank, when it accepted the fraudulent wire transfer, func-
tioned as the equivalent of a holder in due course; or whether, in good
faith, the receiving bank changed its position in reliance on the validity
of the transfer order.
No case law on point provides a ready answer to these issues. How-
ever, check forgery cases may provide a useful basis for comparative
analysis. In one such case, Perini Corp. v. First National Bank of Habersham
County, a thief gained access to checks and a perfect copy of a facsimile
signature used by Perini, the victimized company.1 2 2 The thief opened
accounts at First National Bank for two fictitious sole proprietorships.
Next, he deposited seventeen forged checks to the two accounts,
indorsing each check with the facsimile signature.' 2 3 These indorse-
ments technically were unauthorized because they were in a personal,
and not representative capacity. 124 First National accepted the checks,
however, and entered them into the collection stream. Perini's bank
paid on all seventeen forgeries. 12 5
After a great deal of analysis, the Fifth Circuit ultimately character-
ized Perini as the victim of a "forged check loss"126 and concluded that
Perini could not shift its loss to First National if the bank was a holder in
due course. 12 7 The U.C.C. defines a holder in due course as "1) a
holder 2) of a negotiable instrument 3) who took it for value 4) in good
faith 5) without notice that it was overdue or had been dishonored or of
119. Bradford Trust, 790 F.2d at 410.
120. U.C.C. § 3-418. For a definition of holder in due course, see supra note 114.
121. "'Holder' means a person who is in possession of... an instrument ...
issued, or indorsed to him or his order or to bearer or in blank." U.C.C. § 1-201(20).
122. Perini Corp., 553 F.2d at 398.
123. Id. at 401.
124. An indorsement is unauthorized if it is "made without actual, implied or
apparent authority .. " U.C.C. § 1-201(43). A check can pass through the banking
system for final payment only if properly endorsed. U.C.C. § 3-202. See also Perini
Corp., 553 F.2d at 403, n.7, and 410.
125. Perini Corp., 553 F.2d at 401.
126. Id. at 420.
127. Id. at 417. Normally, Perini's bank would bear a forged check loss. In this
case, however, Perini had agreed to bear all losses in consideration of its bank
allowing it to "sign" its checks with a signature facsimile.
Cornell International Law Journal
any defense against it or claim to it on the part of any person."' 28 In
order to avoid liability on remand, the court required Perini to show that
First National either lacked good faith or had notice of the error when it
accepted the forged, improperly indorsed checks.' 29
The Bradford Trust court cites Perini to support its claim that the
U.C.C.'s policy of finality should play a role in assigning losses in
"double forgery" cases.130 Yet the court ignores the Perini inquiry into
the good faith of the party relying on the forged instrument and whether
the party accepting the negotiable instrument had notice of a deficiency.
If courts resolve wire transfer cases by analogy to the U.C.C., consis-
tency demands that the party who accepts the fraudulent transfer order
must do so in good faith, without notice of a defect in the order, before
it is entitled to the protection of the finality policy.' 3 1
In Bradford Trust, there is a strong argument that the receiving bank
accepted the transfer order with notice of a potential defect.' 3 2 When
an instrument is "so irregular as to call into question its validity, terms
or ownership, or create an ambiguity as to the party to pay,"' 33 the
Code implies notice of the irregularity. The discrepancy between name
and account number in the Bradford Trust transfer order provided suffi-
cient notice of an irregularity, since it indicated that the beneficiary was
someone who did not even hold an account with the receiving bank.
Nevertheless, the receiving bank accepted the transfer order without
questioning the discrepancy and even calling the coin seller to confirm
that it had deposited the funds. Given this obvious notice of a defect,
the claim that the receiving bank was the equivalent of a holder in due
course simply fails.
As a second defense, the receiving bank might still have invoked the
policy of finality by arguing that it relied in good faith on the sending
bank's promised payment.13 4 The Code defines good faith as "honesty
in fact, ' 135 which most courts interpret as a subjective standard. 136 To
128. U.C.C. § 3-302(1).
129. Id. at 419. See alsoJ. WHrrE & R. SUMMERS, Uniform Commercial Code 617-
18 (2d ed. 1980).
130. Bradford Trust, 790 F.2d at 411. The Bradford Trust Court limited Perini as
applicable only in "double forgery" cases where banks pay on a negotiable instru-
ment containing both a forged signature and a forged or unauthorized indorsement.
See Comment, Allocation of Losses From Check Forgeries Under The Law of Negotiable Instru-
ments and the Unifon Commercial Code, 63 YALE L.J. 417, 455 (1953).
131. See U.C.C. §§ 3-302, 3-418.
132. U.C.C. § 1-201(25)(c). A party has notice of a fact when "from all the facts
and circumstances known to him at the time in question he has reason to know that it
exists."
133. U.C.C. § 3-304.
134. See U.C.C. § 3-418 ("[P]ayment or acceptance is final in favor of a holder in
due course, or, a person who has in goodfaith changed his position in reliance on the payment.")
(emphasis added).
135. U.C.C. § 1-201(19).
136. See, e.g., British Caledonia Airways Ltd. v. First State Bank, 819 F.2d 593, 596-
597 (5th Cir. 1987) (actual knowledge required); First State Bank & Trust Co. v.
George, 519 S.W.2d 198, 203 (Tex. Civ. App. 1974) ("The test is not diligence or
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properly employ the U.C.C. analogy, the Bradford Trust court should
have inquired whether the receiving bank honestly believed the sending
bank's transfer order was genuine. The Bradford Trust court failed to
complete its analogy to the U.C.C. with a discussion of this issue, further
indicating the difficulty and inappropriateness of applying the Code by
analogy to fraudulent wire transfers.1 3 7
3. Dissimilarity Between Checks and Wire Transfers
Even if the Bradford Trust court determined that Southern Bank accepted
the transfer order in good faith and deserved holder in due course pro-
tection, the question remains whether courts and legislatures should
form the law of wire transfers by drawing analogies to the law governing
checks. Both the common law and the U.C.C. dictate that generally,
checks with both a forged signature and an improper or forged indorse-
ment are to be treated as forged checks for which the drawee is liable.13 8
Arguably if analogies to the U.C.C. are appropriate in the wire transfer
context the sending bank should bear the loss when both the sending
and receiving banks are negligent. This argument, however, rests on
the erroneous premise that wire transfers are sufficiently similar to
checks.
Wire transfers differ fundamentally from checks.' 3 9 In a check
transaction, the drawer gives a signed check to a beneficiary who depos-
its it at his bank (the "depositary bank").1 40 The depositary bank settles
the debt by then presenting the check to the drawee bank, which in turn
debits the drawee's account. By contrast, in a wire transfer, the receiv-
ing bank receives the transfer order after the sending bank examines
it.141 Since the receiving bank operates the account into which the
negligence; and it is immaterial that the bank may have had notice of such facts as
would put a reasonably prudent person on inquiry which would lead to discovery,
unless the bank had actual knowledge of facts and circumstances, that would amount
to bad faith.").
137. The Fifth Circuit in Bradford Trust emphasizes some sections of the Code more
than others. However, the court fails to discuss the guidelines in the Code's rules of
construction. The Code provides that words are more controlling than figures. Only
where the words are ambiguous will figures control. U.C.C. § 3-118(c). The name
and number in the Bradford Trust transfer order indicated two different entities creat-
ing the necessary ambiguity. If the U.C.C. applied to Bradford Trust, Southern Bank
would be forced to credit the transfer to the account by the name-John Rochefort-
an account Southern Bank did not hold. The court's failure to discuss or apply this
vital U.C.C. section further demonstrates the inherent weakness in the U.C.C. anal-
ogy. Miller, Commercial Paper, Bank Deposits and Collections and Electronic Funds Transfers,
42 Bus. LAWYER 1269, 1291 (1987).
138. See Comment, Allocation of Losses From Forgeries Under the Law of Negotiable Instru-
ments and The Uniform Commercial Code, 62 YALE L.J. 417, 455 (1953); O'Malley, The
Code and Double Forgeries, 19 SYRAcusE L. REV. 36, 39-44 (1967). If the forger can be
found and he is not judgment-proof, he will be responsible for returning his ill-got-
ten gains. Otherwise, the drawee is liable for replacement of the funds.
139. See WHrrE & SUMMERS, supra note 19, at 810-11.
140. "'Depositary bank' means the first bank to which an item is transferred for
collection even though it is also the payor bank." U.C.C. § 4-105.
141. See WmrrE & SUMMERS, supra note 19, at 811.
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funds are deposited, it is in the best position to compare account names
with account numbers and to detect discrepancies which the sending
bank cannot police.' 4 2 Therefore, the receiving bank should have a
greater responsibility to police against fraud and error than a bank
which accepts a forged, improperly indorsed check. 143 In the checking
context, the drawee bank is the last institution to examine the check
prior to settlement. White and Summers, the most influential commen-
tators on the U.C.C., point out that the drawee bank has the "last clear
chance" to detect an irregularity.1 44 In the case of wire transfers, the
receiving bank is the last bank to examine the transfer order before settle-
ment; it is the bank with the last clear chance to stop the loss.
IV. Fixing the Flaws - the "Last Clear Chance" Doctrine and Receiving
Bank Liability
The tort doctrine of last clear chance has often provided a negligent
plaintiff a means of reviving his right to recovery. In the tort field the
doctrine has fallen into disuse with the advent of comparative negli-
gence. In the commercial context, however, where contributory negli-
gence remains the law, the doctrine may serve a wholly new purpose. 14 5
In Bradford Trust, for example, the sending bank becomes a helpless
plaintiff. Once the sending bank issued the forged transfer order, there
was virtually no way to recall it. Under the standard test of last clear
chance, a court would seek to determine whether the receiving bank had
knowledge of the sending bank's position, in which case it would have a
duty to exercise reasonable care. 146 In Bradford Trust, the receiving
bank's knowledge of the danger to the sending bank may be difficult to
prove. Nevertheless, many states apply the doctrine of "unconscious"
last clear chance and allow recovery even when the defendant does not
know of the plaintiff's peril, but has a duty to discover it. 14 7 The Fifth
Circuit found that the receiving bank was negligent, implying that it had
a duty to discover the discrepancy in the transfer order.14 8
142. White and Summers strongly advocate the position that the two transac-
tions-checks and wire transfers-are so entirely different that liability must be
assessed for each transaction very differently. See WHITE & SUMMERS, supra note 19,
at 811.
143. Id. at 811,815.
144. Id. at 811.
145. White and Summers point out that the drawee bank has the "last clear
chance" to detect irregularities in check transactions just as the receiving bank in wire
transfers. White and Summers suggest that the bank with the last clear chance
should stop the loss or be liable for paying on a forged instrument. Id. Guided by
ordinary negligence principles, the sending bank should invoke last clear chance to
shift its loss.
146. See PROSSER & KEETON, supra note 105, at 462-64.
147. Id. at 465-66.
148. Bradford Trust, 790 F.2d at 411. There are no Texas cases which apply the
doctrine of last clear chance in a commercial dispute. Therefore, one could argue
that just as comparative negligence is improper, so is last clear chance. There are
three responses to this. First, last clear chance, unlike comparative negligence, is a
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Important policies support the argument that the receiving bank
should bear liability when it negligently fails to spot and subsequently
pays on a transfer order with a discrepancy between account name and
number. The law ought to assign liability to the party that can most
cheaply and easily avoid losses.' 49 Generally, assigning liability to the
cheapest cost avoider will make wire transfers less expensive. Lowering
the cost of wire transfers will encourage the use of wire transfers as a
form of payment, facilitating international trade. Both the sending and
receiving banks in Bradford Trust could have avoided the loss in this case
by implementing simple security procedures. In more complex future
cases, however, it may be much more difficult for the sending bank to
prevent loss.
It is important to note that both parties have the ability to assign
liability to the sending or receiving bank prior to executing the transfer
order. For example, members of the CHIPS system are bound by the
rule that "[a]ny loss incurred due to a fraudulent transfer originating at
a participant [in a CHIPS transfer] shall be borne by such partici-
pant."' 150 When private parties contract, the party that assumes liability
can take whatever steps are necessary to insure against loss. Presuma-
bly, the contracting banks who joined the CHIPS network had sound
business reasons for agreeing to sending bank liability. Absent a com-
pelling rationale, courts should refrain from interfering with such pri-
vate ordering and business judgment.1 5 ' As with any form of
contracting, however, courts and legislatures must set certain ground
rules. At a minimum, rules developed to govern wire transfers can pro-
vide a gap-filling function when parties fail to plan for cases of fraud and
mistake.
An international wire transfer can involve several different banks
and several different wire transfer networks.15 2 As banks and wire trans-
fer networks are added, the number of bank employees handling the
transfer also increases. Anywhere along the process, an individual han-
dling the transfer may, fraudulently or merely by accident, send a legiti-
court-made doctrine. Thus, courts are on firmer ground when expanding its scope.
Second, because last clear chance will shift liability once sending bank negligence is
shown, it does not result in the same uncertainty regarding the appropriate level of
insurance that comparative negligence does. Finally, last clear chance will keep liti-
gation costs down because last clear chance will avoid a long complex trial to prove
relative fault.
149. See Comment, supra note 5, at 632 (arguing that the "least-cost-avoider" prin-
ciple is widely adopted in other areas of the law, including the U.C.C.).
150. WHrrE & SUMMERS, supra note 19, at 816 n.13, (quoting Rules Governing
Clearinghouse Interbank Payment System, Rule 10).
151. WHITE & SUMMERS, supra note 19, at 815. For an example of a case that looks
to private arrangements to determine wire transfer rules, see Middle East Banking
Co. v. State Street Bank, 821 F.2d 897 (2d. Cir. 1987), where the court looked to
rules and comments of the Council on International Banking to determine banking
practices and general understandings within the Banking community.
152. For an example of such a complex wire transfer transaction, see Patrikis, supra
note 17, at 31.
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mately initiated transfer order to an unauthorized destination.15 3 Given
the increasing risks of error and the enormous sums of money that could
be lost or stolen, bankers should concern themselves not only with
fraudulently initiated transfers, but also with honest mistakes by bank
employees. 15 4 Banking entities must also consider safeguarding against
unauthorized access to the telecommunications system itself.
Considering the potential vulnerabilities of the wire transfer system,
it would not be unduly burdensome for the last bank in the chain of
messages to make a final check to insure nothing has gone awry during
the transaction. The receiving bank is the only bank which is capable of
determining whether the account name and number are consistent.
Critics may argue that the added cost to the receiving bank may out-
weigh any benefits gained by policing against fraud and error. If this is
the case, receiving banks may simply adopt a system whereby they pay
the beneficiary on the basis of the account number alone.
Nevertheless, assigning liability to the receiving bank when it
accepts an inconsistent transfer order is still appropriate. The receiving
bank has the most complete information regarding how much it will cost
to implement a defense against such losses. Thus, the receiving bank is
the party in the best position to insure efficiently. Whether the receiving
bank buys insurance, self insures, or forgoes insurance altogether, plac-
ing liability on the receiving bank will result in the most efficient pricing
of wire transfer services. 15 5
Conclusion
Article 4A of the U.C.C. assigns liability to the receiving bank if it pays
on a transfer order with a discrepancy between account name and
number. United States courts and legislatures, UNCITRAL, foreign
sovereigns, and the international banking community should adopt the
153. "[E]rrors can occur at all points in the wire transfer system, including at the
point of initiation, in the manual procedures associated with the creation, processing
and release of a message, and in the handling of the incoming message. These errors
occur for a number or [sic] reasons. During a phone conversation with the sender, a
clerk might record the wrong amount of money. Incoming messages-especially if
written in a foreign language or if the dollar amount is in a foreign currency-can be
misinterpreted. System failure, either with the bank's computer or the network's
computer, can cause confusion as to which messages were and were not
processed.... Finally, clerical errors, such a [sic] typographical error, can lead to
improper enrichment." TIEN, supra note 3, at 17. Out of 207 wire transfer incidents
surveyed, 108 errors led to fraudulently absconded funds; only 6 of 13 fraudulently
initiated wire transfers succeeded. Id.
154. One recent study suggests that most wire transfer fraud occurs after an error
by an innocent bank employee sends a legitimately initiated payment to an unauthor-
ized individual. The unauthorized individual, wishing to keep his windfall of fre-
quently hundreds of thousands of dollars, quietly absconds with the funds. TIEN,
supra note 3, at 64.
155. The argument that holding the receiving bank liable in these cases will result
in a decrease in the level of care on the part of the sending bank fails. Sending banks
still must police against fraud and error because of the possibility that the unauthor-
ized transfer order contains no discrepancies between account name and number.
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approach of Article 4A. The National Conference of Commissioners
created the article specifically to address problems in the law of wire
transfers. 15 6 The approach taken by Article 4A will not work as a hard-
ship on the receiving bank because it is in the best position to determine
the costs of preventing losses and can most easily implement efficient
safeguards to prevent them. Article 4A, by assigning liability to the bank
that can most effectively prevent loss, provides an equitable framework
for protecting wire transfers and should be adopted internationally.
Howard S. Koh*
156. WHrrE & SUMMERS, supra note 19, at 811.
* I wish to express my thanks to and admiration for Professor Robert S. Sum-
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